Lazarus Group and APT38, cyber actors associated with the DPRK, are responsible for the theft of $620 million in Ethereum reported on March 29.
FBI statement on attribution of malicious cyber activity posed by the DPRK - 14 April 2022
Official record and on-chain address OFAC recent actions, 14 April 2022: Lazarus Group SDN entry updated with ETH address 0x098B716B8Aaf21512996dC57EB0615e2383E2f96
An attribution is the government's conclusion from its investigation; the public records do not publish the underlying evidence. The sanctioned address shows where funds went, not how the bridge was compromised. Neither record says anything about whether a different bridge is safe.
Not financial advice. The Crypto Online is a verification desk, not an accredited fact-checker.
Large thefts attract instant attribution on social media, much of it guesswork. When a government does attribute an attack, it usually leaves two kinds of record: a statement, and sometimes a sanctions action naming addresses. This check reads both for the theft from the Ronin bridge reported on 29 March 2022.
The Claim
The claim is that North Korea’s Lazarus Group carried out the theft. The FBI put it this way in its statement of 14 April 2022 (archived copy; the live fbi.gov page blocks automated access): “Lazarus Group and APT38, cyber actors associated with the DPRK, are responsible for the theft of $620 million in Ethereum reported on March 29.”
The Receipt
A statement is one record; a sanctions action is a second, independent one. On the same date the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control published an update in its recent actions for 14 April 2022 amending the Lazarus Group’s entry on the Specially Designated Nationals list to add a digital currency address: ETH 0x098B716B8Aaf21512996dC57EB0615e2383E2f96. That address can be opened on a public block explorer by anyone.
A later Treasury record ties the pieces together. When OFAC sanctioned the Tornado Cash mixer on 8 August 2022 (see our check on the 2025 delisting), it said the mixer had been used to launder over $455 million stolen by the Lazarus Group “in the largest known virtual currency heist to date”. The attribution in the FBI statement is matched by the sanctions record. Graded supported.
What It Doesn’t Prove
An attribution is a conclusion. The FBI and OFAC publish the result, not the evidence behind it, so readers are relying on the government’s investigation. The sanctioned address shows where stolen funds were held; it does not explain how the bridge was compromised. For that you need the operator’s own post-mortem, read critically – our guide to reading a hack post-mortem explains what a credible one contains.
Why Bridges Keep Appearing in These Records
Blockchains cannot see each other. A bridge lets value cross by locking an asset in a contract on one chain and issuing a representation of it on another. Three properties follow, and together they explain the pattern of losses. The bridge holds pooled collateral, often in very large amounts in one place. Something privileged – a set of validators, a multisig, a relayer – decides when to release it. And the two chains share no source of truth, so the bridge’s own attestation of a deposit is what the destination trusts. Compromise that attestation and you can withdraw without depositing.
A wrapped token is therefore a claim on collateral held elsewhere. If the collateral is drained, the wrapped tokens may still show in wallets while no longer being redeemable for anything. For a user, the reasonable questions are limited but useful: who can authorise a withdrawal, and how many genuinely independent parties are involved? Is the contract upgradeable, and by whom? Is there monitoring that reconciles locked collateral against wrapped supply? See cross-chain bridge and multisig in the glossary, and our check on bridge backing claims.
How to Check It Yourself
- For any attribution, look for the agency’s own statement and note its date and exact wording.
- Check the Treasury’s recent actions page for the same period; sanctions updates list addresses in full.
- Open a listed address on a block explorer and confirm it exists and has activity. Our guide to tracing funds through a transaction shows the next steps.
FAQ
Why link an archived copy of the FBI statement?
The live fbi.gov page returned HTTP 403 to automated requests when we checked; that is a blocked page, not a missing one. The archive copy shows the text with its capture date.
Is interacting with the listed address illegal?
US persons are generally prohibited from dealing with sanctioned persons and their property. For your own situation, take qualified legal advice; this page is not legal advice.
Does the attribution tell me which bridges are safe?
No. It concerns one incident.
Not financial advice.
Sources
Not financial advice. Human-edited; AI-assisted drafting is disclosed in our editorial guidelines. Spotted an error? See how corrections work.